In the Name of Legislative Intention by Horack, Frank Edward, Jr.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1932
In the Name of Legislative Intention
Frank Edward Horack Jr.
Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the American Politics Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Political History
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Horack, Frank Edward Jr., "In the Name of Legislative Intention" (1932). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1196.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1196
IN THE NAME OF LEGISLATIVE INTENTION
FRANK E. HORACK JR.*
Jeffersonian conceptions of individual freedom and equality
have kept alive the doctrine that our government is one of laws
and not of man. In this idea there is safety, for if law is justice
and judicial opinions are produced, cellophane wrapped, by some
monotonously automatic process which man cannot disturb, then
man lives ",non sub honine sed sub deo et lege", and is free from
mortal tyranny. This Latinism, however, is too easy an answer
to the problem of law and government, and men came to suspect
that "homine" came first in the business of governing men, just
as it did in the motto. God and the law were, at best, only second
place.
In practice law enforcement and judicial decision depend,
upon man and not upon the law itself. Man controls the law
rather than law controlling man. Man can do with law what he
wishes so long as he uses the sanctioned form. Thus Rabelais
tells us that Judge Bridlegoose was threatened with impeachment
not because he gave the wrong decision but because he used large
dice in a doubtful case.' The controlling rule was a formal one
requiring small dice for hard cases-the result was not important.
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
'"My practice is . ... as the custom of the judiciary requires, ....
having exactly seen, surveyed, overlooked, received, recognized, read, and
read over again, turned, and tossed over, seriously perused and examined, the
bills of complaints, accusations, impeachments, indictments, warnings, cita-
tions, summonings, comparitions, appearances, mandates, commissions, dele-
gations, instructions, informations, inquests, preparations, productions,
evidences, proofs, allegations, depositions, cross-speeches, contradictions, sup-
plications, requests, petitions, enquires, instruments of the deposition of
witnesses, rejoinders, replies, confirmations of former assertions, answers
to rejoinders, writings, deeds, reproaches, disabling of exceptions taken,
grievances, salvation-bulls, re-examination of witnesses, confronting of them
together, declarations, denunciations, libels, certificates, royal missives, let-
ters of appeal, letters of attorney, instruments of compulsion, delinatories,
antieipatories, evocations, messages, dimissions, issues, exceptions, dilatory
pleas, demurs, compositions, injunctions, reliefs, reports, returns, confessions,
acknowledgments, exploits, executions, and other such like confects and
spiceries, both at the one and at the other side, as a good judge ought to
do, .... (then) I give out sentence in his favor unto whom hath befallen
the best chance by dice; . . . . 'But', quoth Trinquamelle, '. . . . how come
you to know, understand, and resolve the obscurity of these various and
seemingly contrary passages in the law, which are laid claim to by the
suitors and pleading parties?' 'Even just', quoth Bridlegoose, 'after the
fashion of your %vorships; to wit, when there are many bags on the one side
and on the other, (that is, if the case is doubtful) I then use my little small
dice .... in obedience to the law . . . . I have other large dice, fair and
goodly ones, which I employ .... when the matter is more plain, clear and
liquid; .... " RABELAIS, GARGANTUA ET PANTAGRUEL, III, 39.
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The modern refinement of this anecdote is that Bridlegoose, J.,
used the right sized dice and thus could not be convicted even
though the dice were loaded! In fact it is suggested that all
judges use loaded dice. That is, for every legal situation there
are sufficient rules reaching enough diverse results that as judges
select their rules they have likewise selected their results. The
judicial process is a process of preference?
Some legal commentators have thus concluded that law is
only what the judges say it is-that it is but a record of past
events and exists neither for the present nor for the future.
Fortunately law is more than this. Many men rely upon it
throughout active lives without the tragedy of a law suit. Law
is predictable-the difficulty is that the basis of its predictabil-
ity may not be upon the basis of time honored rules which have
outlived their usefulness but upon elements recognized but not
expressed in the opinions of the judges.
This is particularly true in the field of statutory interpreta-
tion. The judges still do lip service to canons propounded in
Coke's time and perpetuated by Kent' and Blackstone,' although
the decision of the cases rest upon more significant bases.
It is axiomatic that there is no problem of interpretation
when the legislative declaration is clear, direct, and precise.
Interpretation is legitimate only in case of ambiguity. But what
is clear? What ambiguous? When X says, "A big bundle of
bills came this morning", does Y know what X received? Was
it a handsome stack of 'greenbacks', bothersome evidences of un-
paid debts, or a package intended for his friend, William? The
statement is clear to X; to Y it may or may not be ambiguous.
To objectively evaluate the statement is misleading and inaccurate.
Classification of it is unimportant. Y is only interested in learn-
ing what meaning X is trying to convey. A similar interest should
motivate courts in the use of statutory materials.
2Another modern view suggests that the case was decided while the judge
was eating breakfast.
3Judges "must keep within those interstitial limits which precedent and
custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of otherjudges through centuries of the common law have set to judge-made innova-
tions. But within the limits thus set, within the range over which choice
moves, the final principle of selection for judges, as for legislators, is one
of fitness to an end." CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS(1928) 103.
'1 COMMENTiARIES (14th ed. 1896) 610 et seg.
51 COMMENTARIES 85-91.
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The problem of interpretation when applied in the field of
government arises because the legislature makes the law' and the
courts apply it. And since the departmentalization of govern-
ment,' the task of applying generalized standards of conduct to
particularized consequences makes even an honest difference of
opinion inevitable. This conflict is expressed, in the language of
statutory interpretation, by declarations that statutes are either
clear or ambiguous.8 The conclusion is that if the statute is
ambiguous it is in need of interpretation. In fact, the interpreta-
tive process, at this point has been practically completed. Inter-
pretation is but comparison and judgment and both of these pro-
cesses take place before the court can determine the existence of
ambiguity. Nothing is ambiguous in the abstract; or else, every-
thing in the abstract is ambiguous.
Thus if a specific statute is to be applied to a specific case
there must in every instance be interpretation.' It may be brief;
but it must exist. The mere recognition that the statute applies or
does not apply involves the interpretative process. A realization
of this fact will not require, however, a written opinion on inter-
pretation in every case in which statutory materials are used.
On the contrary, in many cases long opinions justifying the ap-
plication of apparently relevant and unambiguous statutes will
be unnecessary. In short, if statutory materials were treated more
analogously to case materials, a more natural relationship between
case and statute law might be established.
Instead, artificial canons of inquiry have been created by
which the applicability of the statute is tested and then by equally
artificial standards of value the validity of the interpretation is
evalued. Since Austin's time interpretation has been classified as
0 Of course there are other agencies for the formation of law. "But among
one hundred and fifteen million people the bulk of those who think at all on
the subject believe that they elect senators and representatives to 'make'
their laws, and that the judges only 'interpret' and 'enforce, the laws that
other people make. No other popular conception is equally untrue except the
belief in Zion City, Illinois, that the world is flat." Richberg, The Judicial
Barricades (1929) 62 SuRvEy 479, 503.
'Originally there was no problem of interpretation for the judges were
also members of Parliament. Thus in Auymeye v. Anon., Y. B. 33 & 35 Edw.
I, 82, Hengham, J., said to counsel "Do not gloss the statute; for we know
better than you; we made it." See also Anon. v. Thomas the Notary, Y. B.
32 & 33 Edw. I, 429, where Hengham said, "We agreed in Parliament
.... "t."
aBut see, Caminetti-v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192 (1916)
in which case five justices found the act clear and unambiguous, while three
of their brethren found the act in need of interpretation.
09,.... interpretation never has been and never can be wholly dispensed
with, owing to the nature of our minds . . . " Loyd, The Equity of a
Statute (1909) 58 U. or PA. L. REv. 76, 80.
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genuine and spurious. Genuine interpretation is said to be the
process by which a court applies a statute either literally or by
trying to find "directly what the law-maker meant by assuming
his position in the surroundings in which he acted and endeavoring
to gather from the mischiefs which he has to meet and the remedy
by which he sought to meet them his intentions with respect to
the particular point in controversy"." Spurious interpretation
"seeks to reach the intent of the law-maker indirectly. It assumes
that the law-maker thought as we do on general questions of morals
and policy and fair-dealing"."
This classification accepts one process and stigmatizes the
other. It attempts to say that the interpretation which actually
discovers the legislative intention is good and the interpretation
which does not attempt to discover the legislative intention is
bad. But it is as likely to put sheep in wolf skins as it is to
trick the unwary lamb, for the two methods of interpretation are
not as easily distinguishable as their definition might suggest.
For example, in Holy Trinity Churchi v. United States," the
Supreme Court held that the Alien Labor Act did not prevent a
New York church from contracting with an English pastor for
"labor and services" to be performed in this country. The act
prohibited any contract with an alien for labor or services prior
to his migration or importation. Certain skilled and professional
groups were specially exempted from the operation of the act.
Ministers of the gospel, however, were not included in this ex-
emption. The court said the act would not apply for "we cannot
think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction
like that in the present case".' The style of this language is
purely subjective and by that test the interpretation, spurious.
But if this intention existed in fact it can hardly be said the inter-
pretation is bad if it reaches the same result reached by Con-
gress."
Thus accidents in expression often determine the interpreta-
tive process as genuine or spurious. Thus if the court uses direct
and positive language to describe the "condition which was before
the legislature and which resulted in the enactment of the statute"
their interpretation will probably be called genuine; but if with
"Pound, Spurious Interpretation (1907) 7 COiL. L. Rv. 379, 381.
1" Ibid. 381.
143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511 (1892).
Ibid. at p. 459.
,But quaere whether Congress ever had any intention one way or another
on this questioni The probability is that it never accurred to them and it
was not considered.
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greater caution they declare the statute resulted from "those con-
ditions which we believe the legislature must have considered",
the interpretation will be labelled spurious. In other words, any
indication that the interpretation does not result from objectively
determinable materials will taint the character of the interpreta-
tion. But the truth is that all of these problems are considered
subjectively-the judge weighing the knowledge he has of the
reason for the legislation with his own experience and the neces-
sities of the case before him. To make an objective and subjective
classification of interpretation is at best to make only a distinction
of degree.
This distinction which has been expressed in terms of genuine
and spurious interpretation may have some foundation in the dual
problem involved in all interpretation-that is, the problem of
language and the problem of policy. Perhaps we may say that
genuine interpretation concerns itself only with the clarification
of language while spurious interpretation attempts to determine,
or in many cases, substitute for the legislative policy the policy
of the courts. But even such a distinction as this helps but little,
for most problems of language arise because of differing beliefs
concerning the wisdom of legislative policy. Thus any attempt to
treat these two problems independently would overlook the actual
fact that they most frequently exist together.
This is well illustrated by Powell v. Kempton Park Race-
course Co.,' where the court was required to interpret the meaning
of the word "place". Generally, a racecourse can be considered
a "place". But the question was whether it was a place within
the meannig of the Betting Act of 1853, which provided that "No
house, office, room or other place shall be opened, kept, or used
for the purpose of * " 1 betting * * *. "" In the Queens Bench
five judges held that it was not a place, one judge held that it
was. Upon appeal four agreed that they thought it was not a
place; two judges dissented. Clearly a racecourse was a place but
whether it was a place for betting depended not upon any rules of
language or of logic but upon the policy announced by Parliament.
The policy, not the words alone, determined the result.?
16 (1897) 2 Q. B. 242; (1899) App. Cas. 143.
16 16 & 17 Vict., c. 119, § 1.
17" 1.... unfortunately in the cases in which there is real difficulty it
(interpretation) does not help us much, because the cases in which there is
real difficulty are those in which there is a controversy as to what the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used with reference to the
subject matter is." Lord Blackburn in Caledonian Ry. Co. v. No. British
Ry. Co. (1881) 6 App. Cas. 114, 133.
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The problem thus becomes more than a problem arising from
the application of formal rules of interpretation; it becomes a
problem of separation of powers, of inter-departmental relations.
Until the court's conception of its own position in the application
of statutes is appreciated, the difficulties with the formal rules
cannot be understood. When the court is applying abstract and
often uncertain legislative declarations of rules, principles, and
standards it will be seriously influenced by the philosophical ideal
in which it pictures its own position.
The courts, for example, have not changed their technique
in handling statutory materials although the court's position in
relation to statutory materials has been completely altered. Where
courts were once considered purely as common law tribunals, the
enormous increase in statutory material has changed the actual
function of courts of law to approximate more closely the civil
law ideal of 'courts as agencies for the application and administra-
tion of the legislative precept. Law is no longer the sacred pre-
cept of the court but the common property of the masses. It
is the expression of what they believe to be their will and it
is not for the courts to frustrate it because of too nice legalistic
conceptions of law and government. But the common law tradi-
tions have not been so easily overthrown. Consequently the courts
still view the products of the legislative assemblies from attitudes
which are unknown and unpersuasive to the legislators.
Another cause of the courts' unreadiness to make more liberal
use of statutory materials, is the case-law tradition of the com-
mon law system. Courts have traditionally looked to cases for
the solution of cases and have only interstitially relied upon the
statutes. It is a reflection of the distrust with which the judges
viewed legislation which attempted to change the legal order as
they had constructed it."' The canons of interpretation likewise
reflected the attitude, and thus the rules of strict construction of
statutes in derogation of the common law, strict construction of
penal statutes, and the like, were developed.
Because of the inapplicability of many of these canons of
interpretation and the apparent harsh results that have some-
times resulted from formalist application of these rules the courts
have received much criticism. The burden of this criticism is
ISee Cain, The Will of the People (1929) 16 Am. Mer. 394.
"Originally courts refused to change the common law upon the enact-
ment of a statute unless the common law was specifically abrogated by
negative words. It was only reluctantly that they implied an intent to
abrogate when the words used were in the affirmative. See Townsend's
Case, 1 Plowd. 222a, 234a.
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that rules are forms by which the courts reach the results they
wish, and the "intention of the legislature" is used to give some
judicial justification to the result. In spite of such criticism some
of the rules of interpretation may operate in a pragmatically
satisfactory manner if unhampered by agglutinative refinements.
One of these rules is the much maligned rule that statutes should
be interpreted according to the "intention of the legislature".'
H
From the beginning, it should be understood that the suc-
cess of this method of interpretation depends on the elimination
of the artificial classification of statutes into those which are clear
and those which are ambiguous. The objection that it would be
dangerous to allow a court to interpret a statute which is clear
and precise is not valid. If the purpose of interpretation is to de-
termine the legislative intention, then, interpretation of that which
is clear and precise is of the safest variety for it is almost certain
of applying the statute in accord with the wish of the legisla-
ture.
The more usual objection is that there is no such thing as
legislative intention. It has been said frequently, that the prob-
lem of interpretation is to give meaning to that which is meaning-
less.' To do this the court must give expression not to what the
legislature thought but to what they would have thought had they
thought. And even when some demonstrable intention appears
to exist it is difficult, as Radin has pointed out, to say that the
legislature, as a group, had intention, "in connection with words
which two or three men drafted, which a considerable number
rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority
might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas
and beliefs ".'
The accuracy of this observation cannot be questioned. Gen-
eral legislative purpose,' in statutes of general public concern, is
20 An early statement of the rule may be found in Heydon 's Case, 3 Co.
Rep. 7, 7a (1584). "And then the office of all the judges is always to
.... add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true in-
tent of the makers of the act, pro bono publico.1"
219 .... when the legislature has had real intention one way or another
on a point, it is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises as to
what its intention was . . . . The fact is that the difficulties of so-called
interpretation arise when the legislature has had no meaning at all; when
the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; ... .
Gray, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw (1909) 165.
"Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 RARV. L. REv. 863, 870.
' General legislative purpose is to be distinguished from the precise intent
that may or may not exist in regard to specific situations. Thus in the
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at times discoverable, but to credit the legislature, taken collective-
ly, with intention expressed in unequivocal terms upon specific
statutory provisions, seems difficult, if not impossible. But even
this admission does not necessarily drive us to accept Radin's
further contention that because of the ephemeral character of
legislative intention, "it is a futile bit of fiction". Indeed, either
to affirm or deny the existence of legislative intention is to under-
take one of the tasks of Hercules.
There always exist, however, the practical necessity of giving
some effect to the legislative enactment. Upon occasion legisla-
tures have seen fit to enact legislation without a definite enuncia-
tion of policy,2' have failed to express their policy adequately,"
or because of the elapse of time their intention has become un-
certain.' In these situations it seems commensurate with our
ideals of efficiency and economy to allow the court to apply the
legislation according to the rule which they believe the legislature
would have provided. This is admittedly "judicial law-making"
but the exercise of the power in this limited field of application
in no way hinders the legislature from altering the rule or
standard if they do not approve of the interpretation adopted by
the court. The objection to this, of course, is that it permits the
Camninetti case, supra n. 8, the general legislative purpose was the suppres-
sion of immoral practices. But whether or not Congress intended to pro-
hibit certain kinds of immoral practices was open to reasonable doubt.
2 See, for example, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. The exigencies
of the situation may at times require that policies be compromised, changed,
or even abandoned in order that some action result from the legislative
session. Or the majority and the minority may agree that some legislative
action is desirable but disagree as to the policy to be adopted and the end
to be achieved.
25X was driving a team of oxen along a railroad right of way. They
became frightened and ran into the defendant's engine. A statute provided
that "when any cattle or other live stock shall be killed by the engines or
cars running on any railroad, it shall be prima facie evidence of negligence
on the part of the company .... " s Randall v. Railroad, 107 N. C. 748, 12
S. E. 605 (1890). Three judges said the statute applied; two dissented.
Shepherd, J., dissenting, said "When one is driving his horse, or a lady is
riding her pony, is it customary to say that the man is driving one of his
"cattle", or that the lady is riding one of her "live stock"? .... The mere
statement of the question . . . . furnishes its own answer."1 What did the
legislature intend? Was there attention directed toward this situation? For
a similar difficulty consider the problem of the application of criminal
statutes in tort situations for the purpose of making non-negligent action
negligent. Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874); Scott v. Missouri-Kan-
sas-Texas Ry. Co., 22 S. W. (2d) 654 (Mo. 1929); Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn.
323 (1885).
26 See Tripp v. Goff, 15 R. I. 299 (1886). Cf. MeBoyle v. United States,
283 U. S. 25, 51 S. Ct. 340 (1931) (The question was whether Congress in-
tended to include airplanes in the definition of motor vehicle. The court
said, "Airplanes were well known in 1919 when this statute was passed,
but it is admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or in the de-
bates in Congress.")
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subjective determination of policy to rest with the courts and not
with the legislatures. But it is not to be overlooked that in the
determination of every case the policy involved and the result
to be reached is not overlooked by the judge.' It is a psychological
impossibility. For as Radin says, "It is obvious that somewhere,
somehow, a judge is impelled to make his selection-not quite free-
ly, as we have seen, but within generous limits as a rule-by those
psychical elements which make him the kind of a person he is.
That this is pure subjectivism and therefore an unfortunate situa-
tion is beside the point. It is hard to see how subjectivism can be
avoided or how the personality of the judge can be made to count
for nothing in his decision on statutory interpretation as on every-
thing else".' This states the difficulty but it is no basis for con-
cluding that the use of legislative intention as a guide to the
interpretation of statutes should be abandoned. True, it is de-
sirable that the discretionary power of the courts which tends to
make them law-makers should be limited; but it is also desirable
that legislation be applied to cases which the legislature did not
contemplate but would have regulated if they could have fore-
seen them. Some adjustment is necessary and apparently it is
some device by which the courts can apply these "doubtful"
statutes (which probably is, a more socialogically desirable thing
to do than. to declare that in as much as the legislature has not
clearly stated its will the court will not attempt to deal with the
case at all) in as objective a manner as possible. The "intention
of the legislature" rightly applied reaches this result with the
least difficulty and with the greatest protection to those who fear
oppression from judicial discretion.
III
In negligence cases a similar problem has confronted the
courts and they have sought to meet the difficulty involved in
subjective and objective tests of fault and care by applying a
standard of "what a reasonable man would do under the circum-
stances". No one suggests that a reasonable man must actually
exist, or that the doctrine is necessarily undesirable because of his
non-existence. Nor is the use of the reasonable man test a panacea
for all the difficulties inherent in the tort problem; but as a tool
"Hence, I will not hesitate in the silence or inadequacy of formal
sources, to indicate as the general line of direction for the judge the follow-
ing: that he ought to shape his judgment of the law in obedience to the same
aims which would be those of a legislator who was proposing to himself to
regulate the question." Cardozo, op. cit. supra n. 3, 120.
' Radin, op. cit. supra n. 22, 881.
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intelligently used it affords a means of increasing objectivity. The
"legislative intention" test does the same for statutory inter-
pretation.
If a man acts willfully and knowingly he is judged in tort
by his acts; the same is true of legislative action. Where the
legislative policy can be discovered aid the court applies that
policy, there can be no valid criticism of the court's action. And
in many situations the legislative intention is discoverable. The
process of discovery may at times seem new and strange to the
profession but for the diligent it offers unrevealed possibilities.
Science has found the study of embryology to illuminate the
understanding of human evolution; the embryonic stages of legis-
lation furnish equally valuable service to the interpretor of
statutes. The Delphic utterances of our legislatures often take
meaning when former legislation and its difficulties are consider-
ed,2" or when the legislative history of the instant statute with
its amendments, alterations, and substitutions is made clear.'
Likewise, the committee hearing,' the committee report,' the ex-
planation of the committee chairman,' and the resulting legislative
action often make clear words which till then were uncertain and
29 For example, the Jones-Stalker Amendment, Act of Mar. 2, 1929, c. 473;
45 Stat. Pt. 2, 1446 (1929); 27 U. S. C. A., § 91 (1931 Cu.), to the
National Prohibition Act cannot be well understood without an appreciation
of the difficulties attendant on the enforcement of the original legislation.
See also, Landis, A Note on 'Statutory Interpretation' (1930) 43 HAav. L.
REv. 886, 891 and Holy Trinity Church v. United States, supra n. 12, at 143
U. S. 465; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397 (1922).
81 See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789 (1923) 37 HtRv. L. REV. 49, 85; United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S.
547, 41 S. Ct. 569 (1921); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186
U. S. 238, 22 S. Ct. 881 (1902).
mPenn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523, 534, 40 S. Ct. 397,
401 (1920).
="It is not our purpose to relax the rule that debates in Congress are
not appropriate or even reliable guides to the meaning of the language of
an enactment . . . . But the reports of a committee, including the bill as
introduced, changes made in the frame of the bill in the course of its passage
and statements made by the committee chairman in charge of it, stand upon
a different footing, and may be resorted to with proper qualifications."
United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 247 U. S. 310, 318, 38. S. Ct. 525.
(1910). It is interesting to note that in spite of a continual denial of ad-
mitting legislative debates the court in Dunlap v. United States, 173 U. S.
65, 75, 19 S. Ct. 319 (1899) said, "without questioning the doctrine that
debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which
to discover the meaning of a statute . . . . it is nevertheless interesting to
note that efforts were made in the Senate to amend the bill . . . . " Per-
iaps at some future time the courts under proper restrictions will admittedly
give some considerations to information derived from such source.
3Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 474-477, 41 S. Ct.
172 (1921); Wisc. Ry. Comm. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563,
589, 42 S. Ct. 232 (1922).
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ambiguous. Interpretation founded on such materials is real.
There is actual safety in such interpretation. It should be en-
couraged.
But where the legislature has had no intention,' or where
its explanatory materials' are as ambiguous as the legislation
itself there is real difficulty in applying the rule of "legislative
intention". To speak in these instances of finding the legisla-
tive intention is "to condone atavistic practices too reminiscent
of the medicine man".' There is, of course, no real intention.
But again the tort rule furnishes assistance. Where uncertainty
exists concerning certain conduct we test it by applying the "rea-
sonable man" test. Is there not also a "reasonable legislature"
test to be applied in this interpretation situation?
Actual legislative materials are lacking. It is desirable that
the statute be interpreted and applied to the particular case. It
does not seem unreasonable, then, that the court should have the
power of applying the statute. But all will agree that their dis-
cretion should be limited. What would be an easier or more
practical way than to require the court to determine the meaning
of the statute according to the intention which it believes the
legislature would have adopted had the problem been called to
their attention?
The very fact that courts feel reticent to express their own
opinion concerning the meaning of legislation and feel that they
should seek the intention of a body similar to that which enacted
the statute is of considerable aid in limiting the more or less un-
restrained discretion that courts possess. Thus while this method
will not prevent "judicial law-making" it will help to control it
and tend to make it more predicable, though, of course, the ob-
jection to judicial law-making is not that it is not predicable but
that it is judicial.
Dean Pound has discouraged this kind of interpretation, that
is, spurious interpretation, because he said it subjected courts to
rAThat is, where the legislature had no intention other than that the com-
mon law situation be changed. See n. 24, spra.
'It is not un-natural that in cases of sharp differences of opinion where
the policy is complex and the struggle bitter that the committee reports, the
hearings, and the legislative procedure will not present a clear or determina-
tive picture of the policy of the statute. In such case the observation of
Campbell, C. J., in Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. C1. 463,
500 (1914) is not amiss, "These references were not made by the court in
order to ascertain the meaning of the act, but rather and usually arguendo
as vindicating and confirming the conclusion which the court would and did
reach without recourse to such extrinsic matter to enable it to reach this
conclusion".
0 Landis, op. cit. supra n. 29, at 891.
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three dangers.' It brought the law into disrepute. It subjected
the courts to political pressure. It introduced the personal ele-
ment into adjudication. While these three dangers no doubt ex-
ist they do not entirely preclude the use of an interpretation
which avowedly attempts to inculcate meaning where it is totally
absent.
The pressure of the law and of legal sentiment is an effective
device for keeping the interpretative process from dragging the
law into disrepute, for Pound, himself, has told us that the judges
feel most keenly the comment and criticism which is directed at
them by their professional associates on the bench and at the
bar. If courts refuse to apply their technique to the solution of
cases merely because the legislature has not clearly set forth a
standard, they endanger their reputation to a far greater degree
when a strong popular sentiment clamors for the extension of
legislative relief. The danger of political pressure is no doubt a
real one, but the judicial consciousness that their decisions if un-
founded will bring them into "disrepute" will furnish the need-
ed safeguard. The third danger, the introduction of the personal
element into adjudication is not an introduction at all; Radin has
expressed it well when he said "it is hard to see how subjectivism
can be avoided". Spurious interpretation does not introduce sub-
jectivism; it is merely an expression of a condition already ex-
isting.
These dangers inhering in making the court, as some have
styled it, a third house of a tricamerally organized legislature de-
pend chiefly upon the character of the court itself. No system
can entirely eliminate the human element. It has done enough if
it guards against the abuse of individual discretion, for a certain
amount of choice in the application of abstract rules is inevit-
able. The technique and tradition of the legal profession, and of
the judges whom we draft from it, will afford the protection
against abuse from within and the approbation or condemnation
of the profession will have the necessary deterring effect from
without. Interpretation which seeks real intention and only when
it does not exist, seeks the intention the legislature might be as-
sumed to have intended will not greatly endanger the supposed
balance of our institutions.
The solution of the problem which makes interpretation
necessary is largely with the legislature. There is less necessity
for interpretation, particularly of the objectionable character, if
m Pound, op. cit. supra n. 10, at 384.
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the statutes are carefully drafted. Most interpretative problems
arise from legislation prepared by careless and un-skilled legisla-
tors who still believe there is something thaumaturgic about the
phrase "Be it enacted". A thorough appreciation of the pre-
legislative, the social, economic, as well as the legal difficulties
involved; skill in directing legislative procedure, so that each step
in the consideration of the act will leave a photostatic impression
that can be presented in court; and acumen in the mechanics of
draftsmanship that the imperfections in human expression may be
reduced to a minimum; are necessary before the legislative pro-
cess can present materials accurate enough to make interpretation
a true and reliable science.
This, of course, is an easy way for lawyers and courts to
shift responsibility. But legislatures are not free from censure,
for most of them have been un-interested in correcting their pro-
cedure, recording their committee hearings and reports, or im-
proving the form and content of their statutes. Although, some
years ago there was a fairly widespread adoption of the legisla-
tive reference bureau the force of its valuable assistance has been
felt in but a few states and in Congress. Legislators have not for-
gotten that "statutes like razors must be made to sell".
Consequently so long as ambiguity is to human advantage
there will be need for interpretation and courts and lawyers will
bear its burden. And as it is desirable at times to be ambiguous,
so it is frequently desirable to insure the certainty of legislative
intention with explicit extrinsic material. Thus in most cases
diligent search will discover real and legitimate legislative in-
tention.
We worship false gods if we malign a search for legislative
intention because some have under its protective cloak borne it
false witness. Legislative intention is discoverable for those who
do not fear the unexplored pages of the statute books and their
official glosses.
OThe "guinea-stamp of the sovereign" is not enough to make legislative
enactments "law". Perhaps we must return to such devices as the preamble,
used in some disguised form as in the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended
by the Transportation Act of 1920, § 15a (5). See also the Federal Labor
Act, May 20, 1926, 44 Stat. 577 (1926); Federal Radio Commission Act,
Feb. 23, 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
